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The Great Transformation of Tibet? Rapid
labor transitions in times of rapid growth
in the Tibet

Autonomous Region

Rapid subsidy-sustained growth since the mid-1990s in the Tibetan areas of Western China has been
associated with a rapid transition of the local (mostly Tibetan) labor force. In the Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR), the proportion of the local labor force registered as employed in farming and herding dropped from
76 percent in 1999 (the most agrarian workforce in China at the time) to 56 percent by 2008. This shift out
of agriculture was mostly absorbed by rapid increases in the proportions of locals employed in services and
construction. While some of this change probably reflects seasonal migratory workers who are still fairly
well embedded in their rural places of emigration, the speed of transition has nonetheless been exceptional
compared to other parts of western China. Moreover, the speed of transition in Tibetan areas outside the
TAR might well be even faster. These changes are analysed through a longitudinal and comparative trend
analysis of aggregate employment, wage and national accounting data, comparing the TAR to several other
provincial cases in western China and the national average, as a means to reflect on the profound changes
that are occurring to Tibetan people’s lives in very real and rapid ways. To the extent that many of these
socio-economic changes may be irreversible, they highlight particular concerns regarding the preponderant
dependence on subsidies sustaining economic growth in the Tibetan areas, the dominance of Han Chinese
in the urban economies of these areas, and the fact that local Tibetans have very little capability to mediate
these changes politically vis à vis the dominant sources of power dictating regional development policy.

INTRODUCTION
The economies of the Tibetan areas2 in Western
China have been growing very rapidly since the mid1990s—significantly more rapidly than China as a
whole, which has had one of the fastest sustained
growth experiences the world has ever seen. Unlike
the rest of China, economic growth in the Tibetan
areas—as best represented by the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR), which accounts for about one half of
Tibetan areas and population in China—has been
disconnected from local processes of productive
accumulation. Rather, rapid growth has been the result
of a massive degree of subsidisation, mostly from the
Central Government and heavily concentrated in
urban services and construction. In combination with
political disempowerment and outside control of
most sectors of the economy besides agriculture, the
1. Correspondence to: Andrew M. Fischer, Postbus 29776,
2502 LT, The Hague, The Netherlands. E-mail: fischer@iss.nl.
2. In this article, use of the terms “Tibet” and/or ‘Tibetan
areas” refers to all of the Tibetan areas in China, including the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan areas that are
incorporated into the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and
Yunnan.

TAR has essentially been turned into a quintessential
aid economy par excellence, resulting in numerous
polarisations, inefficiencies and other perversions
(see Fischer 2009b).
However, while this growth experience is
evidently an artificially-sustained subsidy bubble, its
socio-economic consequences are not. Rather, rapid
subsidy-sustained growth has been associated with
very real and rapid changes in the socio-economic
structure of Tibetan society. Again, these changes have
been more rapid than changes occurring elsewhere
in China albeit without the relative autonomy that
local people and governments in other regions of
China can rely on to mediate the consequences. Most
fundamental has been the rapid transition of the
local (mostly Tibetan) labor force out of the primary
sector (mostly farming and herding).3 In the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR), for instance, the share of
3. The primary sector is the national accounting term for
economic activities in farming, animal husbandry, forestry and
fishing. The secondary sector includes mining, construction and
manufacturing. The tertiary sector includes non-physical services.
The primary sector in Tibetan areas is about half farming and half
animal husbandry (pastoralism).
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the local labor force considered as employed in the primary
sector dropped from 76 percent in 1999 (the most agrarian
labor force in China at the time) to 56 percent by 2008—a
reduction of twenty percentage points in ten years. This shift
out of agriculture was mostly absorbed by rapid increases in
the shares of local labor employed in services and, to a lesser
extent, construction. Compared to other parts of western
China, the speed and character of transition as represented by
official data has been exceptional, to the extent that within one
decade the TAR has, to a considerable extent, caught up with
the (also rapidly changing) norm in China, albeit without the
productive and sustainable economic foundations to support
these changes as elsewhere in China. Moreover, the speed
of such transitions in Tibetan areas outside the TAR might
well be even faster given the implementation of large scale
resettlement schemes in pastoral areas (which have largely
bypassed the TAR to date) and the closer integration of these
areas into neighboring Han Chinese urban centers. For better
or for worse, the consequences of these transitions in Tibet
deserve urgent attention, particularly if they prove to be
irreversible.
Indeed, the question of irreversibility deserves some
attention for the framing of this article. Some of the decline in
the Tibetan primary labor share probably reflects migratory
workers who are still fairly well embedded in the rural
economies from which they seasonally emigrate for part of the
year in search of off-farm employment. These local migrants
might not be registered as primary sector workers even
though they continue to work in the primary sector for at
least part of the year or, conversely, they might be registered as
working in the primary sector even though they also engage in
informally-organized off-farm work. In either case, the official
data probably exaggerate the degree to which the local labor
force has become disembedded from the rural economy. This
in turn might be taken to imply that these labor transitions
could be reversible if urban employment opportunities were
to become more austere, in the sense that these migrants
could easily return to farming or herding. Nonetheless, such
migratory employment patterns do not necessarily lessen the
sense of rapidity that the official data reflect regardless of their
precise accuracy given that similar migratory considerations
also apply in other parts of western China.
On the other hand, from a global demographic perspective,
we can expect that, once started, these transitions will probably
continue, in the broad structural sense that populations rarely
move back into farming or herding once they have moved out
of these activities (short of some massive traumatic event).4
4. Since the onset of demographic transitions and urbanization
alongside related economic transformations, we have almost never observed
situations where a labor force has re-agrarianized, in a structural sense,
except during episodes of trauma, crisis or extreme social engineering, such
as under Pol Pot in Cambodia, certain periods under Maoism in China, or
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. However, even in these cases,
once the proximate factor is removed, the structural trend in the population
to move out of agriculture reasserts itself, often with a vengeance. For further
discussion on demographic perspectives of urbanization, see Dyson (2011).
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Indeed, the migratory employment patterns discussed above
are fairly typical in early stages of urbanization. Moreover,
one of the most powerful mechanisms of transition in this
regard is education rather than employment. For instance,
my own qualitative observations among secondary students
in the Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan suggest
that once young people leave their rural areas for a few years
to boarding schools in towns, especially at the secondary
level, they rarely return to farming or herding and their
families usually consider them lost causes with respect to
these occupations. Such students might return temporarily
to their rural households to help out, particularly during
summer holidays or spells of postgraduate unemployment,
but I have rarely come across secondary students who
express the desire or intention to move back into farming or
herding as an occupation.5 The article by Iselin in this issue
makes this same point (Iselin 2011). Hence, the structural
shifts observed in the employment data plausibly represent
the unleashing of profound social transformations that,
once started, are unlikely to reverse—even considering the
rural embeddedness of migratory labor or else the potential
prospect of dire economic conditions in the urban areas.6
These transformations will obviously not spell the death of
farming and herding in Tibet, but they will undoubtedly
change the nature of farming and herding within the broader
socio-economic system.
To the extent that many of these socio-economic changes
might be irreversible, they highlight a variety of concerns
particular to the disempowered circumstances of Tibetan
areas and to the role of government policies in mediating
the pace and character of change. A major concern is the
dependence on massive levels of subsidization (relative to
the local economy) that have been driving economic growth
and structural change in Tibetan areas and on which many
Tibetans have increasingly come to rely through the course
of these labor transitions. To the extent that urbanization
becomes increasingly central to these changing employment
patterns, the continuing if not strengthening dominance
of Han Chinese in the urban economies of Tibet and the
associated urban exclusionary pressures faced by Tibetans also
become increasingly contentious, as arguably evidenced by
the outburst of large-scale protests in March 2008. Similarly,
the heightened state of disempowerment faced by Tibetans
in the governance of their regions leaves them with little
capability (relative to populations in other regions in China)
to mediate these changes politically vis à vis the dominant
sources of power determining subsidies and related regional
development policies.
This article analyses these structural socio-economic
transformations through a longitudinal trend analysis of
aggregate employment, wage and national accounting data,
5. These observations are based on fieldwork in Qinghai in 2004. See
Fischer (2009a).
6. Again, see Dyson (2011) for an excellent discussion of these aspects of
urbanization from a global demographic (rather than economic) perspective.

comparing the TAR to several other provinces in western
China and the national average. The TAR is chosen as the
basis of comparison because it represents an entirely Tibetan
experience (in the rural areas), as opposed to the other
Chinese provinces containing Tibetan areas, where rural data
is dominated by the Han Chinese majority.7 Nonetheless,
similar transitions can be observed in other Tibetan areas
as well, albeit with less intensive subsidization and more
intensive integration with neighboring Han urban centers
than in the TAR.
The method used in this study derives from a structuralist
development economics approach, focusing inductively on
the evolution of aggregates, averages and compositions, rather
than on the statistical variations and associations of individual
and/or household characteristics within a sample. This
approach is not used to suggest a structurally-deterministic
understanding of the transitions studied, nor a homogeneous
experience among the social groups represented. Rather,
in combination with an institutionalist understanding of
context, it is used as a means to reflect on the factors and
forces shaping the rapidly changing socio-economic norms
within which people experience and act in a wide variety of
ways. The primary data used are taken from official sources
provided by the National Bureau of Statistics in various
yearbooks. While many criticize these official statistics of
China, their accuracy is arguably sufficient for teasing out
broad structural trends, while obviously keeping in mind that
all social statistical work must be approached interpretatively.8
Indeed, the official statistics are all that we have to understand
the broad nature of socio-economic change in Tibet and thus
it is urgent to exploit them as best we can.
These transformations of Tibet are analyzed in three
sections. The first briefly outlines some of the outstanding
features of recent rapid growth in the TAR since the mid1990s. The second section analyses in more detail the changing
characteristics of employment structure in the TAR that have
accompanied such rapid growth, in comparison to several
other provinces in western China. In the third section, these
employment trends are combined with national accounting
data as a means to measure sectoral imbalances across the
economy, demonstrating the exceptionally heavy urban bias
guiding development strategies since the mid-1990s in the
TAR, particularly in the early 2000s. Despite some attempts
to compensate these imbalances (see Childs et al 2011, this
issue), sectoral polarization has continued unabated since the
early 2000s even despite the huge transition of labor out of
agriculture, while new forms of inequalities appear to have
rapidly emerged within urban areas. The conclusion reflects
on some concerns regarding sustainability and the importance
of prioritizing Tibetan urban employment in this context.

7. Further discussion of this point, see Fischer (2005; 2008; 2009a).
8. For more discussion, see Fischer (2005: 6-12).

RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE TAR
Following a period of sustained economic stagnation (in
real terms) in the early part of the reform period in the TAR,
Beijing started to implement a variety of policy initiatives
from 1994 onwards in order to propel the TAR economy back
towards the per capita national average from which it had
been lagging. These initiatives culminated in the “Open the
West” campaign (OWC; xibu da kaifa),9 announced in 1999,
which was complemented by the Tenth Five-Year Plan in 2000
and supported in the TAR by the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in
2001. Since then, the speed of recent economic growth in the
TAR has been phenomenal, even by recent Chinese standards.
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the TAR more than
quadrupled from 1997 to 2007. In comparison, the Chinese
economy tripled over the same period. As a result, GDP per
capita of the TAR caught up with the average in China, rising
from just under half of the national average GDP per capita in
1997 to just over 61 percent by 2008, reaching 13,862 yuan
in 2008 (versus 22,701 yuan nationally).10
However, this rapid growth in the TAR was dislocated
from productive sectors, particularly the primary sector
(agriculture), which was the largest sector in GDP terms up
to 1996 and employed about three quarters of the workforce
in 2000 (mostly Tibetan). While aggregate GDP in the TAR
increased 3.4 times from 2000 to 2008, the contribution of
agriculture to GDP only grew by about two thirds, falling in
share from 42 percent of GDP in 1995 to 15 percent in 2008.
Industry and mining almost doubled in value-added from
2000 to 2008, albeit from a very small base, with much of the
increase occurring in 2006 and 2007, and this sectoral subcategory remained at 7.5 percent of GDP in 2008. In contrast,
the GDP value-added of construction more than quintupled
from 2000 to 2008, increasing from a previous peak of 17
percent of GDP in 1995 (or 11 percent in 1996) to 22 percent
in 2008, becoming larger than agriculture and almost three
times larger than industry and mining (construction is only
a fraction of industry and mining in every other province of
China). While the increase in construction was disassociated
from productive activities, it was closely associated with
the tertiary sector (a combination of government and party
administration; social services such as education and health;
trade and commerce; transport; and other services). The
value-added of the tertiary sector more than quadrupled from
2000 to 2008, rising from 34 percent of total GDP in 1995
to 56 percent by 2008, becoming by far the largest sector of
the TAR.11 Indeed, the tertiary sector contributed almost the
9. This campaign is usually translated by most scholars—including
myself up until recently—as the “Western Development Strategy”. However,
I have opted for “Open the West Campaign” after discussions with Lara
Marconi, given that this offers a more accurate translation of the Chinese
words xibu da kaifa, which convey a sense of opening and (resource)
exploitation.
10. Data are from CSY (2009: Table 2-15) and equivalent in previous
yearbooks.
11. Calculated from CSY (2009: Table 2-15) and equivalent in each
previous yearbook back to CSY (1997). Data for 1995 is from TSY (2003:
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entirety of GDP increase in certain years, such as 80 percent
of GDP increase in 1996, 87 percent in 2002, or 73 percent in
2005 (despite the ongoing railway construction in that year).
The experience of the TAR was starkly dissimilar to all
other provinces of western China, including Qinghai, the
next most similar province to the TAR in terms of topography
and demography. Subsidization strategies in all other western
provinces were focused on intensively restructuring the
antiquated industrial base left over from Maoist interior
industrialization strategies of the 1960s and 1970s. In all
these cases, intensive subsidization and construction activity
bolstered the leading role of industry within a few years. In
China as a whole, secondary industry (including mining, but
only as a very minor share) was generally the largest sector
driving growth throughout the 1990s and 2000s, amounting
to over 40 percent of GDP. Construction actually shrank from
6.1 of GDP in 1995 to 5.7 percent in 2008 despite the evident
construction boom in China. The share of the tertiary sector
increased considerably in the late 1990s, settling at just over
40 percent by 2008.12 These patterns were broadly similar
in most western provinces, albeit with a stronger role of the
tertiary sector and construction since 2000, reflecting the
larger role of subsidies and investment under the OWC.13
In contrast, rapid growth in the TAR has been based on
rapid tertiarization and a construction boom alongside a small
and constant GDP share of secondary industry. Moreover, the
composition of the tertiary sector in the TAR again contrasts
with the rest of China. While the share of government and
party agencies in the tertiary sector of the TAR has always
been the highest in China, at around 20 percent in the
mid-1990s, it surged in 2000 and 2001 to over 26 percent,
becoming the largest component of the tertiary sector in those
two years and accounting for over 13 percent of total GDP in
2001, or almost twice the entire mining and industrial activity
and close to the total construction activity. Government
administration had effectively become the engine of growth
in the opening years of the OWC. By 2003 it stabilized at
11 percent of GDP, after which the disaggregated tertiary
GDP data at the provincial level ceased to be reported in
the yearbooks. Indirect indicators suggest that government
administration continued to play a leading role throughout
the 2000s, probably more than even tourism, which was
nonetheless skyrocketing in the 2000s (see Fischer 2009b:
41-42).14 In comparison, government administration in China
accounted for only 2.3 percent of total GDP in 2003, while it
accounted for 7.5 percent in Qinghai. The high share in the
TAR (as well as in Qinghai and Xinjiang) probably indirectly
reflects—in part—the relatively large military and/or security
Table 1-12). For more details, see Fischer (2009b).
12. All data calculated from CSY (2009: Table 2-1).
13. See Fischer (2007) for more detail on Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai and
all China.
14. According to data presented by TAR governor Padma Choling,
tourist numbers in the TAR (mostly domestic Chinese) rose from 1.9 million
in 2006 to 6.82 million in 2010 (Tibetinfonet 2011). Tourists would have
exceeded the total population of the TAR of about 2.8 million in 2007.
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presence in these provinces and possibly a strengthening of
this presence in the opening years of the OWC as well.15
In sum, most of the growth generated in the TAR over
these years derived from an alternating sequencing between
tertiary activities (dominated by government administration,
commerce and tourism) and construction (dominated by
large construction projects such as the various components
of the Qinghai-Tibet railway). Both of these drivers were
mostly determined by policies of subsidized spending and
investment decided in Beijing and, to a much lesser extent,
supported by various rich coastal provinces in China. Given
the weight of these instituted sources of growth in the local
economy, changes in provincial economic structure have been
much more radical and volatile than elsewhere in China,
including the next most resembling province of Qinghai.
The magnitude of these drivers relative to the local
economy in the TAR is worth emphasizing. The extremely
high and increasing magnitude of both direct and indirect
subsidies in the TAR almost defies logic, given that they started
to exceed total GDP from 2001 onwards. Even in comparison
to Qinghai, the next most subsidized province of China, the
TAR is exceptional in the degree to which it has exhibited
an extreme level of subsidy dependence that has not abated
over time despite the intensity of investment activity. Local
government expenditure throughout this period remained
over 90 percent funded by direct budgetary subsidies (i.e.
from Beijing to the TAR local government), and these direct
budgetary subsidies reached an astonishing level equivalent
to 81 percent of GDP in 2002 and 90 percent in 2008.
Similarly, the value of total investment (mostly subsidized)
reached levels unparalleled anywhere in China in recent
history, at almost 80 percent of GDP in 2006 and remaining
close to that level in 2008.16 Within this context of extremely
intense subsidization (which has existed since the late 1960s),
the fact that there was rapid growth comes as no surprise.
Rather, it is the sheer inefficiency of such subsidization that is
striking. I have referred to this as “boomerang aid” in Fischer
(2009b), in that most subsidies entering the TAR leave almost
immediately via the trade account or through various other
forms of monetary outflow from the region, accentuating
the delinking of such flows from locally-oriented forms
of accumulation and producing a highly polarized form of
growth as a result.
In this sense, while the various western development
strategies since the mid-1990s were quite successful in
reversing the trend of worsening provincial inequalities in
the first two decades of the reform period, this outcome was
achieved through a sharpening of economic polarization within
western China. In the TAR especially, heavy dependence on
subsidies led to an excessively urban-centric strategy up to the
15. This is a matter of informed speculation, as military activity is a
closely guarded secret in China. See Fischer (2005: 44-45).
16. See Fischer (2009b: 44-48) for further details on data, although the
calculations here have been updated with more recent data from equivalent
tables in CSY (2009).
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16 years and older in the employment statistics).
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Figure 2: Share of Labor in Primary Sector, selected provinces, 1990-2008. Sources: CSY (2009: Table 4-4) and
of these changes probably
equivalent tables in previous yearbooks.
reflect
adjustments
to
introduction, some rural migrants might be registered as
estimates after the 2000 census or else reclassifications and
employed in secondary or tertiary activities even though they
even actual resettlements in the beginning of the OWC.
still spend part of a year working in farming or herding. On
Nonetheless, the slow increase in this number since 2003—
the other hand, much labor migration might be also hidden
around half a percent per year—is significantly less than the
from these data, such as when farmers migrate to urban
rate of rural population increase, which was well over one
areas for six months a year in search of temporary work but
percent over these years, or an even faster rate of growth
otherwise remain registered as rural residents working in the
in the working age population.17 Indeed, this demonstrates
primary sector. On balance, these data are probably accurate
that even in the context of falling fertility and substantial
in a rough sense, in terms of reflecting real changes in socioshifts to off-farm employment, population momentum can
economic structure, as corroborated by the field insights of
nonetheless result in declining per capita landholdings,
myself and other scholars (as noted above).
thereby exacerbating other problems, such as stagnant grain
To a large extent, the shift of the labor force out of
prices (see Goldstein et al 2003 and 2008; Fischer 2005:
agriculture in Tibetan areas implies urbanization, much more
94). These absolute numbers are significant because they
so than other regions of China, given the scarcity of off-farm
reflect that the remarkably rapid transition in the local labor
rural employment opportunities in the Tibetan areas relative to
structure out of agriculture has been happening regardless of
more central and coastal areas of China, where much off-farm
the effect that non-Tibetan (i.e. Han Chinese) out-of-province
employment remains in rural areas. The recent (and heavilymigrants might have had on the overall employment shares
subsidized) surge in rural entrepreneurship and employment
of the TAR. Besides temporary migrants working as vegetable
(as discussed by Childs et al, 2011, in this issue) has attenuated
farmers in cities such as Lhasa or Shigatse, most of who are
this trend in the TAR to a certain degree. Nonetheless, despite
probably not reflected in these statistics, very few of these
the prevalence of entrepreneurial activities in the three villages
migrants come to the TAR to work in agriculture.
surveyed by Childs et al, labor migration still remained the
Notably, these data probably both under and overestimate
most prevalent emerging livelihood strategy for households
actual trends. For instance, on one hand some of these
even in the most “entrepreneurial” of these villages. Moreover,
trends might reflect administered changes in registration
in their similar research reported in Goldstein et al (2008:
status that exaggerate actual socio-economic changes, i.e.
522), urban labor migration to Lhasa, Shigatse or the local
people are reclassified as urban residents even though they
county seat accounted for about half of the overall labor
might continue to farm or herd. Similarly, as noted in the
migration in these three villages. Rural-rural labor migration,
such as on infrastructure projects or housing construction,
17. The TAR has the highest rate of population increase in China,
accounted for the other half of labor migration, albeit these
although fertility started to fall sharply in the 1990s (see Childs 2008; Fischer
2008), Hence, the “youth bulge” in the population structure (see Childs
three villages are located relatively close to a major city
2008: 266) started reaching the working age in the 2000s (considered as age
(Shigatse) and hence would have been relatively privileged in

on par with the national
average—whereas
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Sichuan rural
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fell
Gansu rural
85%
almost 17 percent. If
TAR rural
these data are accurate,
Qinghai rural
80%
China rural
almost
the
entire
proportional shift of labor
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75%
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70%
employment. Similarly,
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65%
percent drop in the rural
share of Sichuan despite
60%
the 17 percent drop in the
1998
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2003
2004
2005
2006
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2008
primary share, resulting
Figure 3: Share of labor classified as rural, selected provinces, 1990-2008. Sources: calculated from CSY (2009: Tables 4-2
in a surprisingly rural
and 4-4) and equivalent in previous yearbooks.
province (at 80 percent
of total employment in
2008) despite the sharp reduction in primary share to 45
terms of off-farm rural employment generation. In this light,
percent, which was close to the national average and probably
the predominant trend in the TAR overall has likely been
reflects strong rural off-farm employment generation
towards a relatively rapid urbanization of the local TAR labor
over these years. Thus, while the Sichuan labor force was
force
less urbanized than that of the TAR, it was also much less
The difference between the rural and primary sector shares
agrarian. In Gansu, the rural share actually increased by 2
of total employment can be used as a proxy measure to reflect
percent, alongside a slight decline in the primary share of 6
these off-farm rural trends. There is a difference—often even
percent. Nationally, trends between these two shares were
in trend—between the shares of total rural employment and
broadly correspondent over this period, with the rural share
primary sector employment. This difference could be taken as
falling 8 percent while the primary share fell 10 percent. In
a very rough proxy for rural off-farm employment although,
sum, among the western cases shown here, the TAR shows
as discussed above, some of this difference might represent
the strongest shedding of primary sector employment outside
misclassifications of people who have migrated to urban areas
of the rural areas altogether.
but have maintained their registration status in the rural areas
If the rural employment share can be taken as a rough
(and even in the primary sector) and hence are counted as
proxy of urbanization,18 it also suggests that the TAR has
part of the rural employed (or vice versa).
been experiencing some of the most rapid urbanization over
Comparing Figure Three with the previous Figure Two
this period, albeit starting from a low urbanization rate of
on primary labor shares, it is apparent that a much stronger
almost 20 percent according to the 2000 census (including
shift out of rural employment took place in the TAR than in
temporary migrants), or 15 percent for Tibetans only. In other
other western provinces, implying that the transition out of
words, the relative scarcity of off-farm rural employment in
agriculture has involved much faster urbanization of the local
the TAR (and other Tibetan areas) implies that movements
labor force than elsewhere in western China. For instance, the
out of agriculture involve relatively greater movements to
share of rural employment in the TAR fell almost 11 percent
towns and cities, and that urban labor markets are relatively
between 1998 and 2008, or about half of the almost 21 percent
much more central to labor transitions in the Tibetan areas
drop in the primary employment share over these same years.
than in other parts of western China.
Notably, this corroborates with the above-mentioned survey
The difference between rural and primary shares also
results of Goldstein et al (2008: 522), in which about half
suggests that there was a substantial increase in the share of
of the respondents who were “going for income” were doing
rural off-farm labor in the TAR in the early years of the OWC,
so by migrating to urban areas, whereas about half migrated
although less so than in other western provinces (and keeping
to other rural areas. As a result, the TAR ended this period
in mind that this measure can be considered as a generous
with a much less rural labor force than in Sichuan or Gansu,
indication of off-farm rural employment, as discussed above).
converging with Qinghai and approaching the national
The difference in rural and primary shares rose from 6 percent
average. In contrast, in Qinghai, the next most similar
of total TAR employment in 1998 to 14 percent in 2003,
province to the TAR in terms of population and topography,
the rural employment share only fell 0.5 percent over this
18. The measurement of urbanization is very problematic in China
period—albeit it started this period with a much lower rural
given that urban definitions are quite different in each of the five censuses
employment share than most other western provinces, almost
share of rural or primary / total employment (%)

90%

(see Yixing and Ma 2003; Fischer 2008).
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consistent with the analysis here.
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and thereafter stabilized at around 16 percent.19 The OWC
even after the completion of the railway construction in
thereby appears to have generated a substantial share of non2006. This corresponds with the boom in rural construction
agricultural employment in the rural areas, particularly after
activity generated by the Comfortable Housing Project (CHP)
2002, albeit to a lesser extent than in other western provinces
under the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, which started in 2006 (see
or the national average, as would be expected of a sparselyGoldstein et al 2010).
populated remote area with “primate” towns and cities. This
Notably, about two-thirds of this secondary employment
would be the result of intensive efforts to raise rural incomes
in the TAR in 2008 was in construction and one-third was
through the provision of rural employment opportunities in
in manufacturing. Despite the recent hype regarding mining
the TAR through intensive subsidization, particularly since
in Tibet, mining and quarrying accounted for a very small
2003, as discussed by
Childs et al (in this issue)
and Goldstein et al (2008;
30%
2010).
20% in construction
64% in manufacturing
Transition out of
10% in mining/quarrying
agriculture and, for the
25%
large part, into urban areas
has resulted in an equally
rapid transition towards
20%
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Figure 4: Secondary sector employment shares, 1990-2008. Sources: calculated from CSY (2009: Tables 4-4 and 4-6) and
Figure Five presents the equivalent in previous yearbooks; TSY (2009: Table 4-2), SSY (2009: Table 4-4); QSY (2009: Table 4-3).
same for tertiary sector
employment.
The share of secondary employment in the TAR is
share of three percent of secondary employment (although
significantly lower than in all other cases, as was historically
employment in this sector might be dominated by migrant
the case (see Fischer 2005) and would be expected of a
workers, many of whom might not be included in these data).
sparsely populated and remote region. Nonetheless, there
In contrast, most other provinces typically show the inverse,
was a notable increase in share following the beginning of
i.e. nationally, two-thirds of secondary employment was in
the OWC, particularly between 2002 and 2003 when the
manufacturing, 20 percent in construction and 10 percent
share rose from 6.2 percent to 9.1 percent. This corresponds
in mining/quarrying, or else 44 percent, 44 percent and 10
with the beginning of major railway construction in the TAR
percent in Sichuan. Qinghai was closer to the TAR in this
and related OWC projects. The increase was sustained and
respect, with construction surpassing manufacturing.
rose further to more than ten percent in 2007 and 2008,
Moreover, 70 percent of the construction employment
and 50 percent of the manufacturing employment in the TAR
19. An alternative proxy measure, based on the combination of three
was in rural areas in 2008. Again, this could represent the
categories of rural employment (township and village enterprises, rural
relatively large amount of activity that was generated by the
private enterprises, and rural self-employed individuals) as a share of total
CHP, from construction to a related range of relatively smallemployment, shows a much lower generation of rural off-farm employment
scale processing activities such as brick making for the CHP
and a greater gap in the share of such employment compared to other
western provinces or the national average. This alternative measure is
(again, see Childs et al in this issue). Indeed, these data reflect
probably overly restrictive, although the broad observations it offers are also
efforts by the government to stimulate off-farm employment
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Figure 5: Tertiary sector employment shares, 1990-2008. Sources: same as above.
percent. With health
and
social
welfare
(nine
percent),
the combined share
in rural areas, although we do not know the degree to which
was
above
fifty
percent.
This
might
be
seen as a sensible
out-of-province (Han Chinese) migrants are included in these
approach
to
employment
generation
in
China,
particularly
data—particularly in urban construction and even in some
in
circumstances
where
manufacturing
absorbs
relatively
rural construction activities (such as the railway versus the
less
and
less
labor
per
value
of
output
and
where
education
CHP). Also, once rural employment is deducted from overall
systems produce a surplus of increasingly well-educated
secondary employment, the sheer paucity of urban secondary
people. Despite China’s status as a rising mercantile nation,
employment is striking, despite the construction boom over
the tertiary category of trade only accounted for eight percent
these years. Again, this might be reflective of the fact that
of tertiary employment, which was less than even health and
much of the urban construction activity employed out-ofsocial welfare.
province temporary migrants, who might not be recorded by
In contrast, all three western provinces detailed here
these data sources.
(Sichuan,
Qinghai and TAR) displayed much larger shares
Despite these signs of increasing secondary employment
of
tertiary
employment in trade and hotel and catering, and
in the rural areas of the TAR, such employment nonetheless
much
smaller
shares in public management, education and
remained much more limited than elsewhere in China and the
health.
However,
the TAR was exceptional in its combination
increase in the secondary employment share by 5.5 percent
of
a
fairly
large
share
for public management at 14 percent
from 1999 to 2008 only accounted for a minor fraction of the
of
tertiary
employment
(albeit this was less than the national
decline in the primary share over the same period by 20.2
average
and
was
probably
much more oriented towards
percent. The bulk of the declining primary share (about three
the
security
apparatus
than
would
be the case nationally),
quarters) was absorbed by the tertiary sector, which rose from
together
with
a
very
large
share
in
trade
(27 percent). Only
a share of around 18 percent of total employment in 1998 to
seven
percent
of
tertiary
employment
was
in education and
34 percent in 2008. Indeed, the tertiary share rose so rapidly
three
percent
in
health
and
social
welfare.
Hotel
and catering
in the TAR over this period that it surpassed the national
in
the
TAR
accounted
for
less
than
public
management,
at
average share in 2008, on par with Qinghai. Despite quite
ten
percent
of
tertiary
employment
in
2008,
which
was
also
divergent patterns in the 1990s, all western provinces and the
less than the employment shares of hotel and catering in both
national average had more or less converged at a very similar
Sichuan and Qinghai despite the enormous boom in tourism
tertiary share by 2008.
in the TAR in the 2000s. Some of these patterns might reflect
However, the composition of such tertiary employment
the employment effects of the protests in Lhasa and beyond
was very different across the various provinces, revealing a
in spring 2008, although these protests and an earthquake
very distinct labor structure in the artificially-subsidized urban
tertiary employment / total employment
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also effected Qinghai and Sichuan. Notably, these categories
of employment in the TAR—public management, trade and
hotel/catering—tend to be dominated by migrant (particularly
Han Chinese) workers, who are probably recorded in public
sector employment data but much less so in the private sector
data (such as in catering).
ECONOMIC POLARIZATION
The rapid increase in the tertiary employment share over
the 2000s is a predictable outcome of the rapid growth of the
tertiary sector in the TAR economy, which came to account
for almost 56 percent of GDP in 2008, up from 45 percent
in 1999, as discussed in the first section. Thus, the rapid
labor transition has, to some extent, balanced the imbalance
in the late 1990s and early 2000s between a very large
tertiary GDP share and a much smaller tertiary employment
share. Nonetheless, this balancing within the tertiary sector
has been accompanied—remarkably—by continuing
sectoral polarization (i.e. a divergence in the value-added
“productivities” across sectors)20 between the primary
and secondary/tertiary sectors of the TAR given the very
imbalanced nature of growth focused on construction and
tertiary services. Notably, sectoral polarization need not occur
if labor transfers proportionately into more rapidly growing
sectors, thereby equalizing out value-added productivities
across the economy, as has happened with labor transfers out
of agriculture in Europe. However, this has not (yet) happened
in the TAR. It also has not (yet) happened in China, although
sectoral polarization in China has been led by manufacturing
while the tertiary sector has played a compensating role.
Polarization in the TAR has been predominantly led by
construction and tertiary services.
Tertiary-led sectoral polarization can be represented by
relative GDP/labor ratios.21 At the beginning of the rapid labor
transition in the TAR in 1999, 19 percent of the TAR labor
force was employed in the tertiary sector, accounting for 45
percent of the GDP of the TAR, and resulting in a relative
GDP/labor ratio of 2.3. By 2008, 34 percent of the labor force
was employed in the tertiary sector, accounting for 56 percent
of GDP and resulting in a ratio of 1.6. The reduction in this
ratio indicates balancing between the GDP and labor shares
of the tertiary sector and equalization between this sector and
the average of the economy over these years. Out-of-province
non-Tibetan migrants probably accounted for a much larger
share of tertiary employment and of tertiary value-added in
2008 than in 1999 due to rapid net in-migration to urban
areas over this period and the fact that Han Chinese migrants
have tended to increasingly dominate the most lucrative
20. GDP value-added is generally used as a proxy for measuring
productivity, even though it represents a combination of output and prices/
wages.
21. I use the term “relative GDP/labor ratio” to indicate the value-added
contribution per employed person in each sector relative to the average in the
economy as a whole (i.e. GDP/total employment). A ratio of more than one
means that a unit of labor contributes more than its share of value-added; and
less than one means the opposite.
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sectors of the urban tertiary sector, in partnership with a small
strata of Tibetan elites (see Fischer 2008). However, we do not
have access to data that would allow for a proper evaluation of
this likely scenario. In contrast, the relative GDP/labor ratio
of the primary sector was 0.43 in 1999 (75.9 percent of labor
accounting for 32.4 percent of economic activity), which then
fell to 0.27 by 2008 (55.7 percent of labor accounting for 15.3
percent of economic activity). The fall in this ratio indicates
marginalization of this sector from the value-added norm of
the economy even despite the rapid transfer of labor out of
the primary sector. In other words, more transfer of labor out
of the primary sector would have been required to match the
speed of growth in the rest of the TAR economy.
The ratio of these ratios—that is, the tertiary GDP/labor
ratio over the primary GDP/labor ratio—can be taken as a
measure of the relative productivity of the tertiary sector vis
a vis the primary sector (as opposed to the previous ratio,
which measures the productivity of each sector relative to the
average in the economy as a whole). This tertiary/primary
ratio rose from 5.3 in 1999 to 5.9 in 2008, meaning that
the average employed person in the tertiary sector in 2008
accounted for 5.9 times more value-added than the average
employed person in the primary sector. The increasing ratio
gives an indication of the degree of imbalance and on-going
sectoral polarization in the local economy—despite growth
in all sectors—and the degree to which such polarization
has served as an underlying economic driver of rapid labor
transitions and urbanization. This is reflective of the nature
of unbalanced rapid growth in the TAR, driven by extremely
intense subsidization concentrated in construction22 and
urban services, which has resulted in unabated sectoral
polarization despite the very rapid shift of local labor out of
farming and herding.
Whether or not sectoral polarization results in increasing
inequality across households is more difficult to judge
without more detailed data given that a household might
include a farmer, a construction worker and a trader or even
public employee among its members. The equalization in
urban-rural inequality since 2001, as discussed in the first
section, has occurred in large part because of the increasing
integration of rural households into secondary and tertiary
sector work. However, the distribution of value-added within
each of these sectors might also be quite polarized. For
instance, rural people employed in the rural tertiary sector
(e.g. in a rural clinic or school) would account for a much
smaller share of tertiary value-added than their counterparts
in urban areas because of the relatively low salaries earned
in such rural tertiary work, compared to equivalent salaries
in the urban tertiary sector, which match those of Beijing or
Shanghai. Similarly, it would be interesting to disaggregate
these data to measure imbalances across the sub-sectors
of the tertiary sector into which urbanizing rural Tibetan
22. The relative GDP/labor ratio of construction is even higher than
the tertiary sector, albeit for much smaller GDP and labor shares (see Fischer
2007: 176-181).

migrants tend to enter, versus those sectors dominated by
Han Chinese migrants, versus those sectors dominated by
privileged Tibetan and Han Chinese cadres, although data are
not available for this exercise.
These speculative extrapolations for the TAR are nonetheless
particularly salient because the size of the tertiary sector in
the TAR, combined with its high value-added per employed
person relative to other sectors and even other provinces,
not only influences local labor transitions and urbanization,
it also drives out-of-province migration into the relatively
lucrative sectors of the TAR such as trade, commerce, tourism
and catering. Indeed, the high value-added GDP contribution
of government administration—perhaps the largest GDP
category of the tertiary sector in the TAR, as discussed in the
first section—is directly due to the instituted wages of statesector staff and workers, and such public employment in the
TAR appears to have become increasingly dominated by nonTibetan non-locals (see below). Thus, increasing polarization
within the urban areas of the TAR in the confluence of these
local and out-of-province migration flows could underlie the
balancing of the overall tertiary sector.
Intra-urban polarization can be represented by a roundabout proxy method that I innovated in Fischer (2007). A
proxy measure is necessary because intra-urban inequality
is difficult to evaluate on the basis of conventional data.
Annual household income surveys only sample households
registered as permanently-residing, thereby excluding most
migrants. Moreover, tabulated income distribution data from
urban household surveys are irregularly provided for the TAR
and other western provinces, making trend analysis difficult.
However, two sources of data that are available in most years
can be used to circumvent these limitations: average money
wages of staff and workers, and per capita urban disposable
incomes. “Staff and workers” are a relatively privileged
sub-category of urban employment in China, referring to
persons working (permanently or on contract) in units of
state ownership, collective ownership, joint ownership, share
holding ownership, and foreign ownership (including Hong
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan).23 Up until recently, there has been
no publicly available data for wage rates other than for staff
and workers, i.e. none has been available for those in the
lower strata of the urban labor hierarchy, such as construction
workers not working under contract. The money wages
of staff and workers would cover many of the privileged
temporary migrants working in the state-sector of the TAR
and other Tibetan areas, typically for terms of two to three
years. In contrast, urban household disposable incomes are
derived primarily (almost entirely in the TAR) from salaries
and wages earned by all households registered as permanently
or long-term residing (i.e. not including temporary migrants)

from all forms of employment, not only staff and workers.
In others words, urban household incomes reflect an average
of all forms of remuneration earned by all urban residents
registered as permanently-residing (about three-quarters
Tibetan in the TAR according to the 2000 census).
The comparison of average wages of staff and workers
to average per capita urban household incomes can give an
indirect indication of wage inequality between the privileged
upper strata of urban employees (including some migrants
and about half of the registered urban workforce in the
TAR) and the average of all (permanently-registered) urban
residents. Average money wages would be marginally higher
than per capita urban household incomes even in a relatively
egalitarian setting given that per capita household calculations
include both working and dependent household members.
Rising inequality, however, can be inferred by a rising ratio.
Figure Six below shows this proxy measure of urban wage
inequality for a selection of western provinces from 1998 to
2008.
Figure Six reveals a sharp polarization of urban wage
inequality in the TAR since 2000, to a level far above the
next most unequal province of Qinghai (according to this
measure). The ratio of staff and worker wages to urban
disposable incomes in the TAR rose from 1.9 in 1999 to a
high of 4.1 in 2007, and then fell slightly to 3.8 in 2008,
in contrast to 2.6 in Qinghai, 2.2 in Gansu, 2.0 in Sichuan
and 1.9 for China as a whole. In light of the dynamics in
urban-rural inequality discussed at the end of Section One
and urbanization discussed in Section Two, these findings
suggest that intra-urban inequality has taken over from
urban-rural inequality as the main schism of stratification in
the TAR under the conditions of rapid urbanization since the
early 2000s.
Two main trends explain this sharp rise in urban inequality.
A rising wage/income ratio could represent rising wages of
staff and workers relative to the average of all urban wages.
Or, it could represent a falling share of staff and worker
employment in total urban employment (among households
registered as permanently-residing), thereby reducing the
weight of staff and worker wages in average urban incomes.
Both cases appear to apply to the TAR.
First, the money wages of staff and workers in the
TAR, which were always above the national average due to
“hardship” considerations,24 rose even faster than the national
average. They almost doubled between 1999 to 2002, from
12,962 yuan to 24,766 yuan, and then almost doubling again
to 47,280 yuan by 2008. From 2002 onwards, these average
wages in the TAR were among the three highest in China,
jockeying for position with Beijing and Shanghai, and around
double the average in China.25 The sharp increases represent

23. Staff and workers do not include persons employed in township
or private enterprises, urban self-employed persons, retirees, re-employed
retirees, teachers in the schools run by local people, foreigners, persons from
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and other persons not included by “relevant
regulations” (CSY 2005, Explanatory notes for Chapter Five).

24. The TAR ranks at the highest of 11 levels in a ranking of so-called
‘hardship” posts in public sector employment in China (‘hardship” defined
according to a lowland Han Chinese perspective).
25. Calculated from CSY (2009: Table 4-23) and equivalent in previous
yearbooks.
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prov. average wage / prov. average urban disposable income

an implicit upward revaluation of hardship compensations
Tibetan cadres outnumbered Tibetan cadres for the first
for staff and workers that has been exclusive to the TAR over
time since 1980. Government assertions that Tibetans were
this period.
the dominant beneficiaries of increasing state-sector wages,
While Beijing has generally taken an approach of rapidly
thereby contributing to an emerging “middle class” of
raising money wages as a means to stimulate consumption
Tibetans,28 became much more tenuous at that time. Rather,
in China, there are varied opinions as to why the alreadyTibetan employment was shrinking during these early years
privileged wages in the TAR would have been raised so much
of the OWC in precisely the parts of the economy that were
faster at the beginning of the OWC. Some argue that this
growing fastest, i.e. the urban state-sector.
was meant to garner the loyalty of local Tibetan cadres and
Conversely, many of the non-Tibetans employed in the
the so-called “emerging Tibetan middle class”. Others argue
state-sector were probably temporary residents on short terms
that it was to make the TAR more attractive for Chinese staff
of official duty in the TAR. Therefore, many were probably
and workers considering a working sojourn in the region,
not included in any of the household income data, although
particularly given the increased demand for skilled labor in
they would have been reflected in the wage data (and possibly
various OWC projects. Both considerations have probably
in some of the employment data). Nonetheless, it is implicit
motivated these wage policies.
within these data that local, permanently-registered Tibetan
S e c o n d ,
these sharp wage
increases took place
4.5
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with a reduction
TAR
4.0
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Qinghai
share of Tibetan
Beijing
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3.5
Gansu
in
state-owned
Sichuan
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between
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National
2001 and 2003,
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2.5
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non-Tibetans
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we have no idea
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Figure 6: Proxy measure of urban wage inequality, 1998-2008 (current yuan). Sources: calculated from CSY (2009) Tables, 4-23
after TSY (2004).26
and 9-15) and equivalent in previous yearbooks
However, we can
ascertain that the fall in staff and worker employment in
urban residents bore most of the brunt of rising inequality in
state-owned units was not compensated by a rise in staff and
these early years of the 2000s, primarily by being squeezed
worker employment in non-state-owned units, as was the
out of state-sector employment. As a result, the sharp wage
case elsewhere in China where reductions in the state-sector
increases were increasingly and disproportionately captured
were matched by increased private-sector employment. To
by non-Tibetans and by a shrinking share of permanentlythe contrary, the state-owned share of total staff and worker
registered urban households, which also helps to explain
employment in the TAR actually rose from 92.2 percent in
the growing divergence between average wages of staff and
2000 to 94.5 percent in 2008.27 In any case, the shift in 2003
workers and urban per capita household incomes up to 2003.
revealed a sudden move away from Tibetan representation
We cannot state whether this has continued to be the case
in urban public employment, i.e. from the most privileged
after 2003 given the lack of data, although these dynamics
and formalized forms of employment in the TAR, and nondefinitely provide much insight into the outburst of protests
that took place in Lhasa and elsewhere in March 2008.
Notably, per capita urban disposable household incomes in
26. Coincidentally, I published a report on these data in early 2005 (see
the TAR—which had been consistently above the national
TIN 2005) on the basis on data provided in TSY (2004). The subsequent TSY
(2005) no longer reported this data.
27. Calculated from CSY (2009: Table 4-8) and equivalent in previous
yearbooks.
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28. See PRC (2001). For an academic version this argument, see
Sautman and Eng (2001).

average throughout the reform period—fell below the
national average for the first time in 2004 and even stagnated
in current value in 2005 and 2006 (i.e. declining in real
value, after accounting for inflation), thereafter joining the
ranks of other poor western urban economies such as Gansu
and Sichuan.29 This lagging was in stark divergence from the
increasing wages of staff and workers. The divergence implies
either a compositional effect that continued after 2003 (i.e. a
shrinking share of permanently-registered urban households
were employed in state-sector employment, as discussed
above), or else that the incomes of the permanently-registered
urban households without state-sector employment (about
half of the workforce in 2004 and mostly Tibetan) were
increasingly lagging behind, if not falling in real terms,
thereby downwardly compensating for the sharp rises in
average money wages of staff and workers. This could have
been the case if, for instance, lay offs from the state sector led
to long bouts of unemployment. Obviously, those Tibetans
who did manage to retain state-sector employment have done
very well.
Outside of the state-sector, the whole array of so-called
“spontaneous” migrants (i.e. migration not organized by the
state, as it is referred to in the scholarship on China) are not
included in either the household surveys or the staff and
worker data. They might be at least partially included in
the general aggregate employment data, although this needs
to be verified. Based on qualitative field insights, informed
speculation and some secondary sources such as the work by
Ma and Lhundup (2008) on temporary migrants in Lhasa,
these migrants include Han Chinese, Chinese Muslim, or
even Tibetans from other parts of Tibet, who largely come
on their own initiative to ply their trades independently in
the urban areas, such as businessmen, construction workers,
shoe menders, restaurant owners, cooks, tailors, rickshaw
or taxi drivers, sex workers, or even beggars. Such migrants
are not necessarily competing for staff and worker positions
in the state-sector, although high state-sector wages do offer
some indication of the subsidy-instituted affluence in the
urban areas of the TAR relative to the conditions found in
most other areas of western, central or even coastal China,
which in turn attract these migrants.
It is difficult to deduce the impact of these migrants on
inequality. However, it is precisely the confluence of these
different streams of migrants in the Tibetan urban areas,
together with local urbanizing rural Tibetans and permanentlyregistered urban Tibetans, that sets the playing field for intense
competition over urban employment opportunities. Given
that these opportunities are overwhelmingly determined by
the centrally-directed subsidization policies that have driven
almost the entirety of rapid urban-centered economic growth
in the TAR, they are characterized by strong linguistic, cultural
and political modes of bias deriving from the dominant Han
Chinese group in control of most power and most financial

flows from outside the province. These biases include
Chinese fluency, Chinese work cultures, and connections to
government or business networks in China Proper. In turn,
local Tibetans severely lag behind Han Chinese migrants
in terms of education, particularly at secondary levels of
education where Chinese fluency and literacy are mostly
obtained by Tibetans. This results in strong disadvantages for
Tibetans competing in these urban labor markets of the TAR,
even despite the rapid increase in primary school enrolments
since the mid-1990s.30

29. Calculated from CSY (2009: Table 9-15) and equivalent in previous
yearbooks.

30. For detailed discussion on these last two points, see Fischer (2009a;
2009b).

CONCLUSION
This article focused on rapid labor transitions in the
context of rapid growth and economic polarization. Section
One outlined some of the main structural features of rapid
economic growth in the TAR since the 1990s up to 2008
in comparison to other selected western Chinese provinces.
Section Two analyzed in more detail the rapid labor
transitions that occurred alongside such growth, namely,
a rapid structural shift out of agriculture. Part of this shift
was absorbed by off-farm employment within rural areas,
particularly in construction activities. However, about three
quarters of the shift was absorbed by the tertiary sector and
a substantial share—perhaps more than half—transferred to
urban areas. The speed of these transitions was so fast that, by
2008, the share of tertiary sector employment in the TAR was
equivalent to the average national share in China, reaching
34 percent of total employment (versus 56 percent in the
primary sector). The third section then examined aspects of
sectoral polarization in the TAR. Despite the rapid transfer of
labor from the primary to the tertiary sectors, the value-added
per employed person has continued to diverge between
these two sectors, reflecting the intensity of the tertiary and
construction focus in recent subsidization strategies since the
late 1990s, which respectively came to account for 56 percent
and 22 percent of GDP by 2008. These trends arguably
constitute a crucial pull factor for both local urbanization and
inter-provincial migration. The invigoration of a rural focus
in development policy since the beginning of the OWC in the
TAR and especially since 2006 under the Eleventh Five Year
Plan has attenuated the trend of rising urban-rural household
income inequality by providing a significant boost to rural offfarm employment in construction and small-scale production
(as analyzed by Childs et al in this issue). However, a sharp
increase in intra-urban inequality also appears to have
paralleled the attenuation of urban-rural inequality over
this period, suggesting that intra-urban inequality has taken
over from urban-rural inequality as the dominant locus of
polarization and stratification in the TAR over these years.
In other words, underlying some heavily-subsidized silver
linings in the rural areas (if the rapidity of the changes in
these areas is to be taken as positive), there has been a broader
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overarching trend of heightened polarization in the overall
economy. In essence, such polarization has been instituted by
the government itself through intentional policies. The third
section discusses this further with respect to urban wage and
household income dynamics in the TAR. The rapid increase
in subsidized urban wealth driving sectoral polarization
has been very unequally distributed between, on one hand,
state-sector staff and workers and others well connected to
state-subsidized networks of wealth circulation in the TAR—
including a shrinking number (up to 2003) of a privileged
cohort of Tibetan cadres—and, on the other hand, the lessprivileged majority of urban residents, including urbanizing
migrants.
These structural trends—and the related educational,
linguistic and cultural modes of bias that severely disadvantage
the majority of Tibetans within their urban labor markets—
provide important insights into the outburst of protests
in March 2008 in the TAR and other Tibetan areas.31 It is
in this sense that the government strategy of attempting to
mollify Tibetans through various development strategies—as
discussed in Goldstein et al (2010)—is probably backfiring.
The short-sighted exclusion of key cohorts of local Tibetans
(especially young graduates) from key growth sectors in the
economy (especially from privileged state sectors of public
employment) stands in contrast to the norm in China where
public employment appears to have played an important role
in creating employment opportunities for an increasingly
educated population, thereby helping to mediate at least
some of the potential dislocations wrought by the rapidity of
change in this country.
This is not to say that all Tibetans are excluded, or that
none benefit. From a poverty perspective, most elites might
survive quite well through the various dislocations wrought
by these rapid transitions. Tibetans in the middle of the
social hierarchy, including some illiterates, might also adapt
relatively well in small businesses or petty trade, and some
might even establish successful large businesses or engage
in profitable investments. Lesser-skilled Tibetans who find
some construction work are able to contribute significant
new sources of monetized income to their households. The
majority of Tibetans who remain in agriculture also appear
to have performed more positively since the early 2000s, as
discussed extensively by Goldstein et al (2008; 2010).
However, the polarization that underlies these marginal
improvements in wealth or poverty reduction also
simultaneously exacerbates dislocation and insecurity across
the social hierarchy. Indeed, exclusions experienced at the
middle or upper end of the labor hierarchy (such as among
staff and workers) is important from the perspective of conflict
given that such exclusions are very politically sensitive, even
if they are not necessarily reflected as increasing poverty.

Moreover, the fact that these exclusionary experiences operate
along educational, linguistic or cultural modes of disadvantage
provides the basis for strong cross-class perceptions and
expressions of grievance. Hence, while the average Tibetan
standard of living has probably improved throughout all of
these rapid transitions, a focus on marginal improvements
misses the point because it distracts attention away from
larger dynamics in the regional economy, within which
those who are marginally improving are being progressively
marginalized from the more lucrative parts of the economy
and levers of decision making, even while becoming more
dependent on the employment generated by the subsidies
producing such affluence.
The dilemma is that the rapid labor transitions that are
being induced by such growth strategies are very real, in terms
of the radical transformation of people’s lives and sources of
livelihoods. Indeed, the speed of transition itself calls into
the question the subsidization strategy; slower change might
render people more capable of self-determined adaptation,
whereas the dependence of the emerging employment
structure on subsidies is so great that the prospect of such
subsidies one day drying up is very worrisome. In light of
such predicaments and to the extent that many of these
structural socio-economic changes prove to be irreversible, as
discussed in the introduction, the prioritizing of preferential
employment generation in the Tibetan areas for local Tibetan
people is urgently needed as a means to avoid rapidly
emerging pockets of urban marginalization within these rapid
labor transitions.

31. See Fischer (2009a). In my analysis of the protests of 2008 I
emphasis various forms of exclusion that had been occurring at middle and
upper strata of local labor hierarchies in urban areas among urban residents
and urbanizing rural migrants.
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